Hardness of Approximation and the PCP Theorem
We have been buying our way out of NP-hardness by
giving
up a little optimality. It is natural to hope the price always keeps falling — that with
enough cleverness every problem gets a PTAS and we approximate as closely as we please. That
hope is false, and provably so. For many problems there is a hard floor: no polynomial-time algorithm
can beat a specific ratio unless \text{P}=\text{NP}. Approximation,
it turns out, has its own theory of intractability.
The engine behind almost every such result is one of the crown jewels of complexity theory — the
PCP theorem — and one gorgeous idea: a reduction that doesn't just map yes/no to
yes/no, but blows open a gap in the objective value, so that even a rough approximation would
answer the original NP-hard question exactly.
Gap-introducing reductions: the core trick
Suppose you want to prove that MAX-3SAT (satisfy as many clauses as possible) cannot be approximated
beyond some ratio. You build a reduction from an NP-complete problem that produces formulas of two
wildly separated kinds:
- YES instances map to formulas where all clauses can be satisfied —
optimum value = 1 (a 1-fraction).
- NO instances map to formulas where no assignment satisfies more than a
\tfrac{7}{8}-fraction — optimum value
\le \tfrac{7}{8}.
There is nothing in between. Now suppose you had a polynomial-time
\rho-approximation with \rho > \tfrac{7}{8}.
Run it: on a YES instance it must report more than \tfrac{7}{8}; on a NO
instance it can never exceed \tfrac{7}{8}. So its output tells you
which case you're in — i.e. it solves the NP-complete problem in polynomial time. Contradiction,
unless \text{P}=\text{NP}.
That is the whole shape of every inapproximability proof: manufacture a gap the approximation would
have to fall inside, and let the approximation's own guarantee sort YES from NO. The figure makes
the geometry vivid — two islands of possible optima with a forbidden channel between them.
The hard part, of course, is building such a gap — ordinary NP-completeness reductions
preserve exact answers but say nothing about approximate ones. Producing a robust, constant-sized gap
for a problem as basic as 3SAT was open for years. Its resolution is the PCP theorem.
The PCP theorem
A probabilistically checkable proof is a proof written so that a verifier can be
convinced by reading only a tiny random sample of it. Formally, \text{PCP}(r, q)
is the class of languages with a proof and a randomised verifier that uses
O(r) random bits, reads only O(q) bits of the
proof, always accepts a correct proof of a true statement, and rejects any purported proof of a false
statement with probability at least \tfrac{1}{2}.
\text{NP} \;=\; \text{PCP}\big(O(\log n),\; O(1)\big).
- Every NP statement has a proof that a verifier can check by using only
O(\log n) random bits and reading a constant number of
its bits — O(1), independent of proof length.
- If the statement is true, some proof is always accepted; if false, every proof is
rejected with probability \ge \tfrac{1}{2}.
Read that again: a proof of any length, checked by glancing at a fixed handful of bits, and a false
theorem cannot sneak past more than half the time. It sounds impossible — yet it is true, and its
equivalent phrasing is precisely a gap version of 3SAT. The constant rejection probability is
the gap; the reduction from a PCP verifier to a constraint-satisfaction instance is the
gap-introducing reduction. PCP and hardness-of-approximation are two faces of one theorem.
What the gaps buy us: sharp thresholds
Plugging the PCP machinery in gives some of the most precise results in all of complexity — down to the
exact constant:
| Problem | Best poly-time ratio possible (unless P = NP) | Trivially achievable |
| MAX-3SAT |
No better than \tfrac{7}{8} (Håstad — tight) |
\tfrac{7}{8} by a random assignment! |
| Set Cover |
No better than (1-o(1))\ln n |
\ln n by greedy |
| Max Clique |
No n^{1-\varepsilon} ratio for any \varepsilon > 0 |
n (essentially nothing) |
| Vertex Cover |
No better than 2 - \varepsilon (under UGC) |
2 by matching |
Håstad's MAX-3SAT result is the jewel: the threshold is exactly
\tfrac{7}{8}, and a coin-flip assignment already achieves
\tfrac{7}{8} in expectation (each 3-clause is satisfied with probability
\tfrac{7}{8}). So the dumbest algorithm imaginable is optimal, and no amount
of cleverness can shave off even an \varepsilon. Max Clique
is the opposite extreme — essentially no nontrivial approximation is possible. These are the
"beyond APX" problems from the previous page, now given hard proofs.
Take any 3SAT clause, say (x \vee \neg y \vee z). A uniformly random
assignment falsifies it only when all three literals are false — probability
(\tfrac{1}{2})^3 = \tfrac{1}{8} — so it is satisfied with probability
\tfrac{7}{8}. By linearity of
expectation, the
expected fraction of satisfied clauses is \tfrac{7}{8} regardless of the
formula — so some assignment hits at least that. Håstad's theorem says you cannot
beat this in the worst case unless \text{P}=\text{NP}. The
thousand-page PCP edifice exists, in a sense, to prove that a coin flip is unimprovable.
Two careful caveats. First, inapproximability is conditional: MAX-3SAT being hard beyond
\tfrac{7}{8} assumes \text{P} \neq \text{NP} — it
is a statement about the barrier, not an unconditional impossibility. Second, and more practically, it
is a worst-case statement over adversarial instances. A gap-hard problem can still be
approximated beautifully on the structured, real-world instances you actually face — the gap
instances are exotic constructions, not your data. And note the Vertex Cover
2-\varepsilon bound leans on the Unique Games Conjecture, still
unproven; hardness results come in tiers of confidence, and it pays to know which theorem rests on
which assumption.