Nothing here required deciding whether returns are normal, log-normal, or anything else — the empirical sample is the distribution. If the historical window happens to include a crash, that crash's severity is already baked into your VaR estimate, fat tail and all.
Suppose the last 20 trading days produced the following daily percentage returns for a single equity index (already sorted worst to best, for convenience):
| Rank (worst → best) | Return | Rank | Return |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | −3.4% | 11 | +0.1% |
| 2 | −2.2% | 12 | +0.2% |
| 3 | −1.5% | 13 | +0.3% |
| 4 | −1.1% | 14 | +0.4% |
| 5 | −0.9% | 15 | +0.5% |
| 6 | −0.8% | 16 | +0.7% |
| 7 | −0.6% | 17 | +0.9% |
| 8 | −0.4% | 18 | +1.2% |
| 9 | −0.3% | 19 | +1.5% |
| 10 | −0.2% | 20 | +2.0% |
Reweight each return onto today's
Try asking for the 99% VaR from this same sample:
With a realistic sample of a few hundred days the sorted hypothetical returns trace out a smooth
empirical cumulative distribution — the fraction of historical days with a
return at or below each level on the horizontal axis. VaR is simply where that curve crosses the
height
Historical simulation's great appeal is also its great limitation: it assumes
the future will resemble the recent past. If your 500-day window happens to
fall entirely within a calm bull market, its empirical tail will look thin — not because risk
is genuinely low, but because your sample got lucky. And a 500-day window is a compromise:
shorter windows react quickly to new market conditions but give a noisy, poorly-populated tail
(as the worked example just showed for 99% VaR on only 20 days); longer windows populate the
tail better but drag stale, possibly irrelevant history along for the ride — a distant crash
can keep inflating your VaR for years after the market has moved on. This exact tension — "the
recent past may not contain the worst case" — is precisely why risk managers don't stop at
VaR and layer on