Portfolio Insurance
A pension fund is sitting on a huge, diversified equity portfolio and is nervous about a crash.
Selling the stock outright fixes the problem but is drastic — it gives up all the upside, incurs
transaction costs and taxes on a scale that matters, and can be politically awkward for a fund
whose mandate is "stay invested in equities." What the fund manager actually wants is insurance:
keep the portfolio, but put a floor under how much it can lose. Having just seen how
a desk manages every Greek
of an options book, we now have exactly the machinery needed to build that floor — and, as we'll
see, to accidentally make the crash worse when everyone builds the same floor at once.
Two ways to buy the floor
The floor is a protective put: hold the stock portfolio, and also hold a put
option on it with some strike K below today's value. However far the
market falls, the put's payoff makes up the difference, so the combined position is worth at
least K at expiry. There are two ways to get there.
-
Buy the real put. Pay an explicit premium today for an index put (or a
basket of puts) with the strike and expiry you want. Simple, and the cost is known upfront —
but exchange-listed puts in the size and tenor a huge fund needs may not exist, or may be
expensive and illiquid.
-
Manufacture the put yourself — dynamically. Don't buy a put contract at all.
Instead, continuously shift the portfolio's split between equities and cash so that the
combined position's value tracks what a real protective put would be worth, at every
possible level the market could reach. This is exactly the delta-hedging machinery from this
module's first two lessons, aimed at replicating an option that was never actually bought —
hence synthetic, or dynamic, portfolio insurance.
The replication weight
A put's delta is \Delta_{\text{put}} = \Phi(d_1) - 1, always
negative. A protective put — long stock plus long that put — therefore has combined delta
1 + \Delta_{\text{put}} = \Phi(d_1). That's the fraction of wealth
the synthetic strategy should hold in equities at any given index level, with the rest parked in
T-bills:
w(S) = \Phi(d_1(S)) \quad \text{— the same function that is a call's delta.}
As S falls, d_1 falls, and
\Phi(d_1) falls with it — the strategy mechanically sells
equities and buys T-bills as the market drops, moving money into safety exactly as
things get scarier. As the market recovers, it mechanically buys back in. Done continuously and
frictionlessly, this reproduces the protective put's payoff without ever paying an explicit
premium — the "cost" of the insurance shows up instead as the same buy-high, sell-low slippage
from rebalancing that
gamma and the limits of delta hedging
described for any delta hedge.
Worked example — de-risking a $100M fund as the market drops
A fund runs synthetic portfolio insurance on a \$100M equity
portfolio, targeting a floor near 5\% below today's index level. As
the index falls, the equity weight w = \Phi(d_1) and the dollar
allocation are recomputed and traded to:
| Index level |
Equity weight w = \Phi(d_1) |
Equities held |
Trade |
| 100 (start) | 0.85 | $85M | — |
| 95 (−5%) | 0.65 | $65M | Sell $20M |
| 90 (−10%) | 0.40 | $40M | Sell $25M |
| 85 (−15%) | 0.15 | $15M | Sell $25M |
Notice the size of the trades: as the market falls further, the fund doesn't just keep selling —
it sells more, in bigger dollar chunks, precisely because \Phi(d_1)
is steepest near the money (the same gamma effect from two lessons ago). A strategy designed to
protect one fund, followed faithfully, demands heavier and heavier selling exactly when the
market is already falling hardest.
Seeing the de-risking curve
Below, w(S) = \Phi(d_1(S)) plots the fraction of the portfolio kept
in equities against the index level, for a floor strike near K = 95.
Reading right to left is reading the market falling: the curve slides down from
"mostly equities" toward "mostly cash," steepest in the middle — the same S-curve shape as a
call's delta, now relabeled as an allocation rule. Shorten the time remaining and the curve
steepens further, meaning larger trades triggered by smaller moves as expiry (or the review
date) approaches.
By the mid-1980s, dynamic portfolio insurance had become hugely popular among US pension funds —
by some estimates, tens of billions of dollars of equity exposure were being managed this way.
The strategy's logic, from the table above, is unambiguous: as the market falls, sell.
The trouble is that logic doesn't know or care that thousands of other funds running the same
strategy are being told, by the same falling market, to sell at the same moment.
We won't finish this story here — it belongs to the derivatives-disasters part of the course,
where we'll look properly at
what actually happened on October 19, 1987,
when the Dow fell further in a single session than it ever had before or has since. For now, just
notice the shape of the mechanism you've already built in this lesson: a rule that mechanically
sells more as prices fall is a rule that, at large enough scale, can help supply the very price
falls it's reacting to.
The word "insurance" invites a dangerous assumption: that the floor is as solid as an actual
insurance policy, backed by an insurer's balance sheet. It isn't. Synthetic portfolio insurance
is a replication — it reproduces a put's payoff only under the same idealized assumptions
every delta hedge relies on: trading can happen continuously, in any size, at close to the
quoted price, with no gaps.
All three assumptions are exactly what breaks down in a genuine crash. If the market gaps down
overnight or limit-locks intraday, the strategy can't sell at the smoothly falling prices its
formula assumes — it sells (if it can trade at all) at whatever price is available after the gap,
far below where w(S) was computed. The "insurance" quietly stops
replicating anything close to a real put exactly when its owner needs it most. A real, purchased
put option has no such problem: its issuer is on the hook for the payoff regardless of how
messily the market got there. That difference — a bought contract versus a trading strategy that
merely imitates one — is the whole story of why synthetic hedges can fail at the worst possible
moment.